

# Security Threats & Attacks on Virtualization for Cloud Computing

by Kushan Sharma (108287X)

A thesis submitted to University of Moratuwa in partial fulfilment of the requirements for the  $\,$ 

Master of Computer Science, Specialized in Computer & Network Security

Department of Computer Science & Engineering University of Moratuwa, Sri Lanka

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#### Abstract

Enterprises continuously seek innovative approaches to reduce operational computing costs while getting the most from their resources. Cloud Computing infrastructures are the latest technological advancement with the potential to maximize resource utilization while reducing costs.

The new paradigm of Cloud Computing possesses severe security risks to its adopters due to the distributed nature of Cloud Computing environments which make them a rich target for malicious individuals. Cloud infrastructure commonly relies on virtualization. The virtualization techniques used in Cloud possess numerous security threats and attacks. In order to cope with these risks, appropriate taxonomies and classification criteria for attacks on Cloud Computing are required. On the other hand Cloud Consumers runs numerous applications/scripts in order to complete their computing tasks. Most of them are too complex and complicated to trust. Even with access to the source code, it is difficult to reason about the security of these applications. They might harbor malicious code such as computer viruses, worms, bots, Trojan horses and spyware or contain bugs that are exploitable by carefully crafted input. It is essential that instead of just relying on conventional defense techniques, the next generation of system software must be designed from the ground-up to provide stronger isolation of services running on computer systems.

To address the above described security threats to Cloud Instances, we propose an architecture for confined execution environment to test untrusted applications/scripts inside Cloud Instances. Modern day security researchers consider malware sandbox analysis is as one of the promising approaches for exploring malware. But most of the previous proposed solutions have various security vulnerabilities due to the way of they have been implemented and the technologies that have been used in the implementation. The proposed architecture and proof-of-concept implementation address all the discovered drawbacks of previously presented sandbox solutions. We monitor all the system calls that are executed by the adversary to confine the adversary and limit the damage an attacker can cause to the Cloud Instance.

The research work related to the proposed sandbox architecture has been tested through LangshaJail, which is the proof-of-concept, built for the Cloud Instances, using latest open source technologies that includes Linux as the Operating System Environment, Linux Resource Containers (LXC) as the virtualization environment and Seccomp as the system call filtering technology. The LangshaJail system was tested for compliance to Cloud Computing security objectives and adherence to performance criteria in order to validate the design approaches and implementation mechanisms used in the research.

Further as a part of the this thesis we present a taxonomy based on the notion of attack surfaces of virtualization for Infrastructure-as-a-Service-based Cloud offerings, thus making them more concrete and improving their analysis. The presented taxonomy specially addresses attacks based on residues of Cloud Instances. These residue based attacks are new venues for attackers that have previously not been addressed.

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#### Abbreviations

- ABI Application Binary Interface
- ACL Access Control List
- API Application Programming Interface
- CC Cloud Computing
- CI Cloud Instance
- CISC Complex Instruction Set Computing
- COW Copy-on-Write
- CPU Central Processing Unit
- DLL Dynamic Link Library
- DNS Domain Name System
- FTP File Transfer Protocol
- GDT Global Descriptor Table
- HTTP Hypertext Transfer Protocol
- ICSPS International Conference on Signal Processing Systems
- IDT Interrupt Descriptor Table
- IDTR Interrupt Descriptor Table Register
- IPC Inter Process Communication
- IRC Internet Relay Chat
- ISA Instruction Set Architecture
- LDT Local Descriptor Table
- LXC Linux Resource Containers
- MMU Memory Management Unit
- MAC Mandatory Access Control
- MMU Memory Management Unit
- NIC Network Interface Card
- OS Operating System
- P2P Peer-to-Peer
- RISC Reduced Instruction Set Computing
- RM Resource Monitor
- SCSI Small Computer System Interface
- SIDT Store Interrupt Descriptor Table
- SDT Software Dynamic Translation
- SFI Software-based Fault Isolation
- SMTP Simple Mail Transfer Protocol
- SNMP Simple Network Management Protocol

TCG - Trusted Computing Group

TCP - Trusted Computing Platform

TOCTOU - Time of Check to Time of Use

TPM - Trusted Platform Module

VM - Virtual Machine

VME - Virual Machine Environment

VMM - Virtual Machine Monitor

## Table of Contents

$\mathbf{D}$	eclar	ation		$\mathbf{v}$
C	opyri	ght St	atement	vi
$\mathbf{A}$	bstra	.ct		vii
$\mathbf{A}$	cknov	wledge	ements	ix
$\mathbf{A}$	bbrev	viation	ıs	X
Li	st of	Tables	S	cvii
Li	st of	Figure	es x	viii
1	Intr	oducti	ion	1
	1.1	Resear	rch Problem	2
	1.2	Organ	ization of the Thesis	3
<b>2</b>	Clo	ud Co	mputing	5
	2.1	Deplo	yment Models of Cloud	6
		2.1.1	Private Cloud	6
		2.1.2	Public Cloud	7
		2.1.3	Community Cloud	8
		2.1.4	Hybrid Cloud	8
		ry Models of Cloud	9	
		2.2.1	Infrastructure as a Service (IaaS)	9
		2.2.2	Platform as a Service (PaaS)	10
		2.2.3	Software as a Service (SaaS)	10
			cteristics of Delivery Models	11
		2.3.1	On-demand Self-Service	11

		2.3.2	Broad Network Access			
		2.3.3	Resource Pooling			
		2.3.4	Rapid Elasticity			
		2.3.5	Measured Service			
	2.4	Funda	amental Security Challenges			
		2.4.1	Loss of Control Over Physical Assets			
		2.4.2	Incompatibility of Storage Devices			
		2.4.3	Secure Communication			
		2.4.4	User Developed Software			
		2.4.5	Patch Management			
		2.4.6	Security Compliance & Standards			
		2.4.7	Data Security			
		2.4.8	Virtualization Security			
	2.5	Refere	ence Model for Cloud Computing			
		2.5.1	The Conceptual Reference Model			
		2.5.2	Scope of Control between Provider and Consumer			
		2.5.3	Research Interest within the Reference Model			
	2.6	Sumn	nary			
9	Cla					
3	3.1		mputing & Virtualization Security alization Security			
	3.1		alization Security			
	3.2		outing			
		3.2.1	Flooding Attacks			
		3.2.1 $3.2.2$	Zombies in the Cloud			
		3.2.3	Cloud Malware Injections			
		3.2.3 $3.2.4$	Rootkit Inside VM Instances			
		3.2.4 $3.2.5$	Side Channel Attacks			
		3.2.6	Malicious Insiders			
	3.3		osed Solutions for Attacks on Virtualization for IaaS-based			
	5.5	-	Computing			
		3.3.1	Virtualization & Hardware-based Security			
		3.3.2	Trusted Cloud Computing with Secure Resources and			
		ა.ა.∠	<b>1</b>			
			Data Coloring			
		222	Data Coloring			
		3.3.3	Virtualization-Aware Malware Protection			
	3 4	3.3.3 3.3.4 Summ	Virtualization-Aware Malware Protection			

4	$\operatorname{Res}$	ource	Isolation & Confined Execution	38	
	4.1	Taxon	nomy of Isolation Techniques	38	
		4.1.1	Language-based Isolation	39	
		4.1.2	VM-based Isolation	39	
		4.1.3	OS-kernel based Isolation	41	
		4.1.4	Hardware-based Isolation	41	
		4.1.5	Sandbox-based Isolation	41	
		4.1.6	VM-based vs Sandbox-based Isolation	42	
	4.2	Confir	ned Execution with Sandboxes	43	
		4.2.1	Reference Model for Sandbox	43	
			4.2.1.1 Purely User-level Sandbox	43	
			4.2.1.2 Purely OS-based Sandbox	43	
			4.2.1.3 Hybrid Sandbox	44	
		4.2.2	A Survey of Sandboxing Techniques for Malware Analysis	46	
			4.2.2.1 Sandbox Analysis with Simulated Internet	46	
			4.2.2.2 Sandbox Analysis with API Hooking & DLL		
			Injection	48	
			4.2.2.3 Sandbox Analysis with System Call Interposition	49	
			4.2.2.4 Sandbox Analysis with Isolated Network	50	
			4.2.2.5 Sandbox Analysis with Standalone Computers	51	
	4.3	Summ	nary	52	
_	<b>T</b> 7•	. 1.		- 1	
5			tion & Sandbox Detection Techniques	54	
	5.1		for VME artifacts in processes, file system, and/or registry	56	
	5.2	Look for VME artifacts in memory			
	5.3		for VME-specific virtual hardware	57	
	5.4 5.5	Look for VME-specific processor instructions and capabilities . 58			
			tion Countermeasures	58 59	
	5.6		al Machine Residues		
		5.6.1	Carving Data of Virtual Machine Residues	59	
	5.7	5.6.2	Experiment Results	61 62	
	5.7	Summ	nary	02	
6	Building Sand Castles inside Cloud Instances				
	6.1	0	ation & Threat Model	64	
	6.2	Featur	res for the Proposed Sandbox	67	
	6.3		sed Sandbox Architecture	70	

	6.4	Summary	73
7	$\mathbf{Pro}$	pof-of-Concept Implementation	74
	7.1	Architecture of the Prototype	74
	7.2	Execution of the Prisoner	77
		7.2.1 Launching Program/Script to LangshaJail	77
		7.2.2 Process Execution	78
		7.2.3 Process Termination	78
	7.3	Use of Existing Technologies	79
	7.4	Building Sandbox Container	79
		7.4.1 Namespaces	81
		7.4.2 Control Groups	82
		7.4.3 Controlled Access to Networking	83
		7.4.4 Controlled Access to Memory	84
		7.4.5 Controlled Access to Audio	85
		7.4.6 Preserving Data Integrity using COW Storage	86
		7.4.7 Life Cycle of LangshaJail	90
	7.5	Filtering System Calls	90
		7.5.1 Problematic System Call Groups	90
		7.5.2 Avoiding Time of Check to Time of Use	92
		7.5.3 Use of Seccomp	95
	7.6	System Call Policy Generation	96
		7.6.1 Initial Policy Template	97
		7.6.2 Interactive Policy Generation	99
		7.6.3 Structure of Policy	100
	7.7	Summary	102
3	Cor	nclusions	103
	8.1	Security Performance Analysis	103
		8.1.1 Detect Malware Using LangshaJail	103
		8.1.2 Observation from Malware Behaviors	105
		8.1.2.1 File Activity	105
		8.1.2.2 Network Activity	106
		8.1.2.3 Resource Monitoring	106
		8.1.3 Thwarting the Detection of LangshaJail	106
	8.2	Overall Review of Sand Castles for Cloud Instances	107
	83	Future Work	108

References 110

## List of Tables

2.1	Comparison between private Cloud and public Cloud	8
5.1	Summary of the result of each experiment	61

## List of Figures

2.1	The Conceptual Reference Model [81, 49]	18
2.2	Scope of Controls between Provider and Consumer $\ [81,49]$	19
4.1	Filtering architecture [40]	45
4.2	Delegating architecture [40]	46
4.3	Overview of the proposed system [143]	47
4.4	CWSandbox architecture overview [140]	49
4.5	Architecture of nicter [52]	51
4.6	Architecture of Cuckoo Sandbox [26]	52
5.1	Virtualized Server Environment used in experiment one	60
5.2	Virtualized Server Environment used in experiment two and three	60
6.1	Job hierarchy that contains a tree of processes labeled P0 through	
	P7	68
6.2	Job hierarchy	68
6.3	Sandbox Reference Model	71
6.4	Syscall Decision Maker	72
7.1	Architecture inside the Jailer	75
7.2	Multiple instance of LangshaJail at a given time	75
7.3	General structure of a system call interception system	77
7.4	A prisoner's process hierarchy	79
7.5	Life Cycle of LangshaJail	90
7.6	Event Analysis of the vi Exploit [137]	93
7.7	Overview of system call interception and policy decision	101
8.1	A Screen Capture of LangshaJail Sandbox Container	104
8.2	A Screen Capture of Jailer Running Inside the Sandbox Container	104